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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how the spread of different international production
networks in East Asia has affected the trade links of the region with the U.S. and Japan. We
concentrate on one particular aspect, i.e. changes in the product composition of U.S. and
Japanese electronics exports and imports to and from the East Asia region. We find that
compared to the U.S. , Japan’s trade links with East Asia display a far greater diversity of the
product groups involved. Of equal importance is a second finding: the trade balances of both
countries with the region are radically different. A consistently high and growing trade deficit
characterizes U.S. trade links with East Asia in the electronic industry. This is true even for
computers and components, the two sectors where the U.S. has re-established itself during the
last few years as an uncontested leader. This is in stark contrast to the situation in Japan, where
a large and rapidly growing surplus characterizes its trade links with East Asia. Although this
is now slowly changing as East Asia has become the most important source of Japanese
electronics imports, there is reason to doubt whether this positive development is strongenough to reduce any time soon the asymmetric nature of Japan’s trade links with East Asia.
    
These differences can only be partially attributed to traditional macroeconomic factors that are
the focus of standard trade theory. In the paper, we show how the observed differences can be
better explained by some peculiar features of the international production networks that
American and Japanese firms have established in East Asia. The chain of causation appears to
work both ways. Changes in the organization of international production have led to changes
in the composition of bilateral trade flows. Such changes in international trade patterns, in turn,
lead to further changes in the organization of international production. 
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This paper by Dieter Ernst and Paolo Guerreri links together two phenomena which are often treated
separately - the pattern of trade specialisation (related to Theme C in the DRUID research programme)
and the formation of international industrial networking relationships (related to theme B). Comparing
the experiences of respectively the US and Japan regarding their trade with East Asia it is
demonstrated that in the field of electronics there is a close connection between how the vertical division
of labour in international production networks is shaped on the one hand and the pattern of specialisation
and the trade balance on the other. 
These results are certainly interesting in their own right and from an empirical point of view. But, they
also point to the need to integrate theoretical elements from strategic management into theories of
international trade and competitiveness. 
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The concept  of an "international production network" is an attempt to capture the spread of broader
2
and more systemic forms of international production that  cut across different stages of the value
chain and that  may or may not involve equity ownership. This concept allows us to analyze the
globalization strategies of a particular firm  with regard to the following four questions: 1) Where
does a firm locate which stages of the value chain? 2)To what degree does a firm rely on
outsourcing? What is the importance of inter-firm production networks relative to the firm's internal
production network? 3) To what degree is the control over these transactions exercised in a
centralized or in a decentralized manner? And 4) how  do the different elements of these networks 
hang together? For  details, see  Ernst, 1994a; 1996; 1997a and 1997b; and Ernst and Ravenhill,
1997
  For an analysis of some of these newly emerging Asian production networks, see Borrus, 1993;
22
Ernst, 1997b  and  Kim  Youngsoo, 1996. A brief comparative analysis can be found in: Ernst, 1997
a.; and Ernst and Ravenhill, 1997.
1. Introduction
Over the last three decades, East Asia has witnessed a massive expansion of international production
by foreign electronics firms. The focus of such investment has shifted twice: first from Northeast Asia
(Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong) to the Asean region (primarly Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand);
and more recently, from the Asean region to China and also now to Vietnam. Foreign electronics
firms thus have substantially extended the geographic coverage of their Asian production activities.
At the same time they have proceeded to integrate their erstwhile stand-alone operations in individual
host countries into increasingly complex international production networks  .
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The firms involved in such international production networks are an increasingly heterogeneous
group. This is true not only for their nationality, but also for their size, their organization and their
competitive strengths and strategies.Today, large multinationals from the U.S., Japan and Europe no
longer are the only carriers of international production in Asia. Three types of newly emerging
networks are now also active in the region: those established by Korean chaebol; those established
by Taiwanese producers of PC-related products and components in Southeast Asia and China;   and
those networks of suppliers of parts and sub-assemblies based in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and
mostly owned by ethnic Chinese .
22
Across the spectrum of the electronics industry, the region is thus witnessing the proliferation of
competing international production networks that are beginning to change the rules of competition,
the market structures, and the prevailing patterns of technology diffusion. This has important
implications for the region´s trade patterns. Peculiar features of these international production
networks have strongly affected the direction of trade flows, the trade specialization and the foreign
trade balances both of host and home countries.  7
  For an attempt to explain Japan´s trade links with Asia with standard trade theory, see
222
Urata, 1993.
  Vernon , 1966 and 1979; and Posner, 1961.
2222
  Dunning, 1981, 1993; Cantwell, 1989; and Lall, 1980.
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze how the spread of different international production networks
in East Asia has affected the trade links of the region with the U.S. and Japan. We concentrate on one
particular aspect, i.e. changes in the product composition of U.S. and Japanese electronics exports
and imports to and from the East Asia region. We find that compared to the U.S. , Japan’s trade links
with East Asia display a far greater diversity of the product groups involved. Of equal importance is
a second finding: the trade balances of both countries with the region are radically different. A
consistently high and growing trade deficit characterizes U.S. trade links with East Asia in the
electronic industry. This is true even for computers and components, the two sectors where the U.S.
has re-established itself during the last few years as an uncontested leader. This is in stark contrast
to the situation in Japan, where a large and rapidly growing surplus characterizes its trade links with
East Asia. Although this is now slowly changing as East Asia has become the most important source
of Japanese electronics imports, there is reason to doubt whether this positive development is strong
enough to reduce any time soon the asymmetric nature of Japan’s trade links with East Asia.
    
These differences can only be partially attributed to traditional macroeconomic factors that are the
focus of standard trade theory . In the paper, we show how the observed differences can be better
222
explained by some peculiar features of the international production networks that American and
Japanese firms have established in East Asia. The chain of causation appears to work both ways.
Changes in the organization of international production have led to changes in the composition of
bilateral trade flows. Such changes in international trade patterns, in turn, lead to further changes in
the organization of international production. 
As long as we only consider explanations derived from standard trade theory, we thus may well miss
some opportunities for a deeper understanding of how international production and trade interact.
In order to explain international trade patterns, trade theory should place FDI and international
production networks at the centre of the analysis. Unfortunately, there is very little theoretical work
on this relationship. Pioneering attempts to establish a unified analysis of FDI and international trade
are the international product life cycle theory of Vernon and the technology gap trade theory of
Posner . A few other scholars have tried to link the theory of foreign direct investment to that of
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industrial organization of multinational enterprises  . Yet, this has hardly affected the main stream
222228
  One encouraging sign is that trade theorists are now more willing to address a research agenda that
222222
is shaped by the assumptions of evolutionary economics (Marshall,  1919 ; Schumpeter, 1912 and
1947;  Penrose, 1959; Freeman, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1982;  Lundvall, 1988; Andersen, 1994;
and Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). See, for example: Guerrieri, 1993; 1994; Dalum et al, 1996
of trade theory: we still lack a unified theory of trade and FDI .        
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The aim of this paper is certainly not to fill this theoretical gap.  We have a much more limited goal:
to provide some empirical evidence and to introduce some stylized facts on the interaction between
trade, FDI and international production networks. We use as a test case the spread of American and
Japanese international production networks in East Asia
The paper is organized as follows. The second section has an introductory character and compares
changes in the product composition of U.S. and Japanese electronics and imports. The following two
sections 3. and 4. have a twofold purpose: They document important differences in the trade links
that the US and Japan have established with East Asia in the electronics industry. At the same time,
we attempt to explain some of these differences by relating them to some peculiar features that
distinguish American and Japanese production networks in Asia. Section 4 also addresses a politically
sensitive issue: are Japanese asymmetric trade links with East Asia likely to decrease over time? We
conclude with a brief discussion to what degree our findings can be generalized and lay out a few
issues for follow-on research.9
2. A comparison of changes in the product composition of U.S. and Japanese
electronics exports and imports
2.1 The Changing product composition of U.S. trade 
In the US, both exports and imports are dominated today by the same two product groups, i.e.
electronic data processing (EDP) and electronic components. Their combined share in exports, since
1989, has remained fairly constant between 66 and 68%. Their combined share in US imports,
however, has substantially increased, from nearly 52% in 1989 to nearly 60% in 1993. While
consumer electronics has been the leading import item till 1988, it has been overtaken first by EDP,
and , since 1993, also by electronic components. 
TABLE  1
Electronics Trade composition: the UNITED  STATES 
(in percentage,  Total Electronics Trade = 100)
U.S. EXPORT IMPORT
1980 1989 1993 1980 1989 1993
Electronic Data Processing 49,2 48,5 41,0 5,4 32,3 39,0
Office Equipment 6,9 4,1 2,6 10,5 6,5 5,1
Telecommunication 3,7 4,6 5,5 2,9 5,3 4,6
Electronic Components 13,4 22,5 27,1 24,2 19,5 20,7
Consumer Electronics 9,9 7,9 10,6 32,5 21,7 18,6
Household Appliances 5,3 3,0 3,2 5,8 4,8 4,0
Other Electronics 11,6 9,4 10,0 18,7 10,0 8,1
Total Electronics 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: UN and OECD trade data, from SIE World Trade Data Base
EDP has consistently dominated electronics exports since 1980. While this share has declined from
more than 48% in 1989 to 41% in 1993, the US electronics industry continues to be centered on the
computer industry. It is interesting to note that EDP has substantially increased its share of US
electronics imports: EDP has been the largest import item since 1989, and its share in US imports has
increased from 32% to 39% in 1993. 10
The increasing share of EDP in US imports indicates the rapid globalization of the US computer
industry. East Asia has played a critical role as an increasingly important supply base both for final
assembly and component manufacturing (Encarnation, 1992; Hobday, 1993; and Ernst, 1996). 
TABLE   2
United  States :  Geographic Electronics Trade Composition 




1970 1980 1985 1990 1992 1994
WORLD 100 100 100 100 100 100
ASIA 64,6 72,1 78,2 77,4 76,7 78,2
Japan 55,0 35,1 49,7 38,5 35,8 32,2
NICs in ASIA 9,5 26,7 22,6 28,7 26,8 27,1
Singapore 0,2 7,4 5,6 10,2 9,6 10,1
Korea 0,3 5,0 5,7 7,6 6,6 7,3
Taiwan 4,8 8,4 7,2 7,8 8,0 7,9
Hong Kong 4,2 5,9 4,2 3,1 2,5 1,7
China 0,0 0,0 0,1 2,1 3,1 4,9
ASEAN 0,0 10,2 5,7 8,1 11,0 14,1
Thailand 0,0 0,6 0,5 2,1 2,7 3,0
Malaysia 0,0 6,4 3,5 4,6 6,4 8,5
Indonesia 0,0 0,4 0,1 0,0 0,4 0,7
Philippines 0,0 2,9 1,7 1,3 1,6 1,8
NAFTA 12,4 13,6 9,5 12,0 12,5 12,4
Canada 9,0 6,5 4,7 6,0 6,4 5,5
TOTAL EUROPE 22,0 12,7 10,4 9,6 9,4 8,3
EU (15) 17,9 11,0 9,5 8,7 8,6 7,5
Source: UN and OECD trade data, from SIE World Trade Data Base11
   For a detailed analysis, see Ernst, 1996; Guerrieri, 1995.
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  The process of local capability formation in the  Korean electronics industry is analyzed in Ernst,
22222222
1997c.
A systematic analysis of the formation of technological capabilities in the electronics and textile
industries of East Asia can be found in: Ernst, Mytelka and Ganiatsos, 1997.
Table 2 clearly confirm that East Asia has become an increasingly important source for US electronics
imports. CE dominated until but its has since then been overtaken by EDP-related products. As we
will discuss later on in detail, these EDP-related imports largely result from the expansion of the
production networks of American computer companies. 
This needs to placed in the proper context: Until the late 1960s investment in the electronics industry
in Asia was dominated by a handful of large multinationals from Europe and Japan, with relatively
little U.S. involvement. Especially for consumer electronics and telecommunications equipment, the
main motivations were tariff-hopping and attempts to reap the substantial windfall profits available
in the highly protected domestic markets. Since then, the focus has gradually shifted to export
platform production . This change was pioneered by American producers of semiconductors and
2222222
computer peripherals and their investment in labor-intensive assembly lines. An equally important role
was played by American producers and mass merchandisers of household appliances who outsourced
an increasing variety of such products to independent OEM suppliers. American producers of PC-
related products, including a variety of semiconductor devices, have played a pioneering role in
establishing export platform production networks in East Asia. They have introduced new forms of
organizing international production that did not necessarily involve equity control. It is this early lead
in the development of new and indirect forms of organizing international production that may have
conveyed substantial competitive advantages to US computer companies. And it is this pattern that
also determined US computer companies increasing dependence, over the years, on input imports
from East Asia. This dependence extends now well beyond Japan and includes a variety of East Asian
countries. Less than a decade ago, their sole attraction used to be cheap labor. Today, these countries
have accumulated an impressive array of production and innovation capabilities .
22222222
2.2 The Changing product composition of Japanese trade 
Japanese exports, until 1988, used to be dominated by CE (Table 3). Since then, EDP has taken over
as the leading export category, and electronic components have moved up to the second position for
the first time in 1989. This trend indicates that by the end of 1980s Japanese electronics exports have
a much more balanced composition than those of the US.12
  Based on Ernst,1997 a.
222222222
TABLE  3
Electronics Trade composition: JAPAN
(in percentage,  Total Electronics Trade = 100)
JAPAN EXPORT IMPORT
1980 1989 1993 1980 1989 1993
Electronic Data Processing 4,6 26,2 30,0 40,2 36,8 36,4
Office Equipment 13,6 9,3 8,5 5,5 3,0 2,2
Telecommunication 2,8 7,0 5,7 1,5 4,9 5,4
Electronic Components 9,0 19,2 24,1 29,0 24,7 27,4
Consumer Electronics 55,1 25,9 19,7 14,7 21,7 20,1
Household Appliances 5,4 1,9 1,5 2,5 3,9 3,3
Other Electronics 9,5 10,5 10,4 6,6 5,0 5,2
100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: UN and OECD trade data, from SIE World Trade Data Base
For CE, Japanese firms have clearly shifted from export to international production as the main
vehicle for penetrating foreign markets. Both for CE and household appliances, there has been a rapid
increase of sales of Japanese overseas affiliates relative to exports, with most of these export platform
activities concentrated in Malaysia, Thailand, China and the ;exican maquiladores (Riedel, 1991; Petri,
1992).
For EDP, Japanese exports consist primarily of peripheral equipment ( printers, floppy disk drives)
and portable PCs (primarily from Toshiba). Since 1990, their share in Japanese electronics exports
has increased only relatively slowly. This indicates that, also for EDP, international market share
expansion through exports may now have run its course, and that Japanese EDP producers will have
to increase their reliance on international production.
Probably the most interesting development is the increasing share of electronics components in
Japanese exports. It increased from 9% in 1980 to more than 19% in 1989, then stagnated between
1990 and 1992 between 18% and slightly more than 20%, and has taken off since then to nearly one
quarter of Japanese exports. Three developments have been of particular importance  :
22222222213
  NEC by far controlled the largest fiefdom, wich a seemingly impregnable 80% market share. Foreign
2222222222
companies, even the most powerful ones, nibbled in frustation at tiny pockets of demand for non-
Japanese operating system - mainly among affiliates of foreign multinationals and banks that required
foreign-language computers. All of  this has changed drastically, since PCs (using Intel’s 386 and 486
MPUs) have become powerful enough to handle Japanese language operating  systems based on MS-
DOS version five, called DOS V/J (where the “J” stands for Japanese).
Nobody should underestimate the determination and capacity of Japanese computer companies to
develop powerful new market deterrence strategies that would enable them to fend off foreign
First, in response to the Yen appreciation, Japanese CE producers all shifted production to Southeast
Asia, China and Mexico, and thus had to increase their exports of CE-related electronics components.
Increasingly however, such components are now procured from sources outside Japan, with the result
that their share in exports has declined. 
Secondly, since the mid-1980s, Japanese IC producers have clearly overtaken their US rivals, and
thus were able to increase their exports to the US and Europe. Since around 1992, such exports
however are now increasingly substituted by sales from Japanese overseas affiliates that have been
established close to the major IC markets. 
Thirdly, since around 1992, Japanese EDP producers are under increasing pressure from aggressive
price war strategies of US computer companies. In response, they have increased their OEM/ODM
purchases in Asia and have begun to shift production to this region. This, in turn, has induced an
increase of exports of electronics components, especially ICs, to overseas suppliers and assembly
affiliates of Japanese firms. 
Changes in the composition of Japanese imports have been also very pronounced  and have been
shaped by a number of different forces. Two product group have dominated Japanese electronics
imports by the early 1980s: EDP and electronics components. Since then, their combined import
share has declined from more than 69% in 1980 to less than 62% in 1989, due to the strong rise of
CE imports, that has been increased from 14% in 1985 to almost 21% in 1993. 
The increasing share of CE in Japan’s import clearly indicates the rapid expansion of  Japanese
affiliates abroad, especially in East Asia and the rise of this region as the main source of CE products
to Japan.
In absolute figures also EDP imports have risen, but in relative terms (percentage shares) the figures
are lower than we would have expected. One should recall that since around late 1991, foreign
companies (primarily American but also some Taiwanese companies) have considerably increased
their share of the Japanese PC market. Until then, the Japanese market was an almost exclusive
preserve for a handful of Japan’s giant, diversified electronics makers, each of which had their own
operating system and attendant software libraries  .
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competitors. As the growth of Japanese PC exports will continue to slow down, Japan’s domestic
market will become even more important as the main source of demand for Japanese cvomputer
companies. Competition for the domestic market thus is likely to intensify further, and Japanese
computer makers will certainly go out of their way to sustain their domestic market shares against
foreign penetration.
Yet, there are also reasons for optimism. Fundamental changes in the Japanese market may have a
last reduced the entry barriers. Japanese companies, including the large corporations, are under
intense restructuring pressure, and are thus forced to shift to lower-cost PC-based networking
solutions, to the detriment of mainframe and microcomputer purchases. Gone are the days when
Japanese corporate customers could indulge in excessive brand loyalty to high-priced Japanese
computer systems. In the current recession, brand snobbery had to give way to an increasingly price-
conscious buying behaviour and a taste for bargain shopping. Japan’s shift to the open architecture
DOS/V operating system, combined with the rapid price erosion for these machines, also has added
a variety of new customers: Japanese SMEs can now afford to buy PC-based systems, while Japan is
now  experiencing for the first time the development of a large home PC market, mainly for multi-
media related desktops. As a result, Japanese firms have rapidly lost marker share, especially for the
home PC market, which, in 1994, has grown by an estimated 35%. Domestically produced PCs
accounted for only 9% of this growth, while the remaining 26% or so were either OEM products
producerd in Taiwan or OBN imports from the US, Taiwan and Europe. (Ernst, 1997a)
As for the import share of electronic components, it declined consistently from 29% in 1980 to
around 25% in 1992. This is consonant with the growing strength of the Japanese electronic
component industry during this period. In 1993, the most recent year, the share of electronics
components in Japanese imports began to increase again, to more than 27%. This reflects the eroding
competitiveness of domestic component production, due to the Yen appreciation, and the
development of domestic component industries in East Asia, especially in Taiwan, South Korea and
Singapore. It is to be expected that the share of components in Japanese imports will continue to
increase in the future.
2.3 Mutual Integration of International Production Networks - Bilateral trade in
electronics between the US and Japan
US exports to and imports from Japan (see Table 4) are again dominated by the same two product
groups that we have identified in table 1: EDP and electronic components. There are however
important differences in the trade composition of both countries. These differences reflect the fact
that of all countries in East Asia, Japan has been the least accessible to US exports and FDI. As a
result, Japan's integration into US international production networks [IPN] has remained quite
limited. Yet, as our figures show, this is now beginning to change.
Let us first look at how the composition of US exports to Japan differ from the general product
composition of US electronics exports, described in table 1.  EDP and components together have a
much higher share in US exports to Japan than they do for US exports in general: their combined15
Apart from fixing a minimum pricing threshold for Japanese exports to the US, the agreement
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contained an informal side letter that stipulated that the Japanese government had agreed, at least
tacitly, to facilitate an increase in the market penetration of US semiconductor exports.
share increased from 65% in 1988 to 76% in 1990, and has since then settled at around 74% in 1993.
One underlying cause is easy to explain: the continuous increase, since 1985, in the share of electronic
components, from slightly more than 14% to more than 26% in 1993. The US-Japanese trade
agreement on semiconductors, concluded in September 1986, obviously has played an important
catalytic role in increasing the market penetration of US component exports  .
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TABLE  4
Electronics : U.S. Bilateral Trade Composition with JAPAN 




1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics trade 100 100 100 100 100
Electronic Data Processing 60,4 51,4 46,8 56,9 47,7
Office Equipment 4,4 2,4 1,6 2,2 1,4
Telecommunication 0,9 2,2 3,0 4,9 6,9
Electronic Components 16,3 14,3 18,2 18,6 26,4
Consumer Electronics 8,3 5,0 7,8 8,2 9,1
Household Appliances 2,5 1,5 1,0 0,9 1,0
Other Electronics 7,2 23,2 21,6 8,3 7,4
IMPORTS
versus JAPAN
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics trade 100 100 100 100 100
Electronic Data Processing 2,5 7,0 15,6 34,2 38,9
Office Equipment 17,9 11,4 9,8 9,8 9,4
Telecommunication 3,2 5,5 6,4 5,3 4,8
Electronic Components 9,2 7,6 13,8 14,4 18,9
Consumer Electronics 45,6 44,5 29,8 22,7 16,7
Household Appliances 5,9 4,0 1,8 1,2 1,1
Other Electronics 15,7 20,1 22,8 12,5 10,1
It is much more difficult to interpret the figures for EDP. As already noted, the Japanese PC market
has been gradually forced open since late 1991. The result has been a rapid fall in the market share
of the Japanese companies, especially NEC, the erstwhile unchallenged market leader, and a
substantial increase in the market share of the US companies, like IBM Japan, Compaq, and other
US manufacturers. If penetration of the Japanese market would occur through exports, one would
expect to find an increasing share of EDP in US exports to Japan after 1990. Table 4 shows that this17
 Ernst  1997a
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has not been the case. The only possible explanation is that sales of US computer companies to the
Japanese market increasingly originate from within East Asia rather than from the US. IBM for
instance serves the Japanese market almost exclusively from its Japanese affiliate and from a number
of component and subassembly manufacturing sites in East Asia. Apple, Compaq and Hewlett
Packard all have concentrated an increasing share of their production in East Asia, most of it centered
around Singapore. Much of this production involves a variety of outsourcing arrangements, ranging
from contract manufacturing of printed circuit boards, to a variety of OEM and ODM contracts,
primarily with Taiwanese suppliers. Both developments are important indicators of the rapid
expansion and deepening that is currently taking place in the Asian production networks of American
computer firms. The result is that a decreasing share of US EDP sales in Japan result from exports;
increasingly, such exports are substituted by sales that originate from within East Asia.
Let us now look at US electronics imports from Japan. By the first half of the 1980s CE still covered
almost half of the US imports. Since then however its share has drastically declined. This reflects an
important element of the restructuring of Japan´s electronics industry: after 1985, Japanese vendors
of CE have rapidly shifted from exports to shipments from overseas affiliates, primarily located in
Southeast Asia .
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By the first half of the 1990s, EDP and components dominate US imports from Japan. The combined
share of both products has rapidly increased from 29% in 1988 to 49% in 1990, and to 58% in 1993.
This has been driven primarily by the rapid increase in the share of EDP from less than 16% in 1988
to almost 39% in 1993. These imports consist of laptop computers (mostly from Toshiba),
peripherals, especially printers (mostly from Canon), and a variety of PC related products that are
either jointly developed or where Japanese firms act as an OEM/ODM supplier. There are no data
available in the public domain that allow us to determine the share of Japanese brandname products
relative to the share of products that result from subcontracting or OEM/ODM arrangements. We
know however from confidential interviews that the share of such outsourcing arrangements can be
substantial. The increasing share of EDP in US imports from Japan thus is a clear indication that, at
long last, the IPN of American and Japanese computer companies become more intertwined.  18
3. How international production networks have shaped U.S. trade links with East
Asia
US exports to the East Asian region, with but one important exception, have been dominated by
electronic components (Table 5). The share of components in US electronics exports ranges from
83% in Malaysia, to 56% in Taiwan, 52% in Thailand,  51% in Singapore, nearly 50% in Korea, 49%
in Hong Kong. The noteworthy exception  is China where the share of components has fallen from
more than 12% in 1990 to less than 2% in 1993, while EDP and telecommunications equipment are
by far the most important  export categories.
As for US imports from these countries, we find a variety of results which reflect the different stage
of development of each of these countries and the different role that each of these locations play as
export platforms for the US market. EDP clearly dominates US imports from Singapore (mainly hard
disk drives) and Taiwan (motherboards, PCs and a variety of PC-related components and
subassemblies). EDP also is the leading import category for US imports from Thailand and Hong
Kong, yet in both countries components and CE also play an important role. Electronic components
dominate US imports from Korea, while CE is rapidly declining in importance. The share of EDP has
rapidly increased, yet it remains way below the share in US imports from Taiwan or Singapore.
Electronic components traditionally used to dominate US imports from Malaysia. CE however has
substantially increased in importance since 1988, as does EDP after 1990. China finally adds another
shade of color to the variety of product compositions of US imports from East Asia: consumer
electronics plus household appliances continue to play a dominant role, while EDP has recently begun
to increase its share.
How do we explain this diversity of trade patterns that link the US with East Asia? In other words,
are changes in comparative advantages based on factor endowment and costs sufficient to explain
changes in the product composition of international trade? Or do we not miss some opportunities for
a deeper understanding of how international production and trade interact, as long as we only
consider comparative advantages? We argue that the proliferation of competing international
production networks has been a major cause for the observed changes in the product composition
of U.S. trade links with East Asia. In effect, the diversity of trade patterns of East Asian economies
reflect differences in the export specialization of different countries as well as differences in their
integration in various IPN. TABLE 5
Electronics : U.S. Bilateral Trade Composition with EAST ASIAN Countries 
(in percentage,  Total Electronics Trade = 100)
USA USA
% Composition of Exports % Composition of Imports
versus Taiwan versus Taiwan
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 23,6 27,2 20,9 20,7 17,7 1,7 8,8 15,6 52,1 61,9
Office Equipment 1,3 1,0 0,6 0,7 0,5 3,5 3,4 4,3 3,7 2,5
Telecommunication 17,0 8,4 6,8 13,5 4,0 2,1 5,5 4,7 3,6 2,8
Electronic Components 17,7 31,5 35,8 39,9 55,9 11,9 9,5 11,9 13,1 17,5
Consumer Electronics 12,3 5,9 8,1 7,1 9,0 56,9 30,1 19,8 11,8 5,6
Household Appliances 4,9 3,3 12,1 7,5 1,8 3,5 6,4 7,4 7,9 5,0
Other Electronics 23,2 22,7 15,7 10,6 11,0 20,4 36,2 36,2 7,7 4,6
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
versus South Korea versus South Korea
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 21,6 17,7 26,7 31,7 23,0 3,0 1,9 4,4 23,5 30,6
Office Equipment 1,5 0,9 1,1 2,0 0,7 2,5 2,1 2,1 1,6 0,8
Telecommunication 10,5 11,8 5,5 6,6 5,1 0,6 4,4 4,4 3,3 1,7
Electronic Components 37,7 52,9 48,8 47,2 50,3 33,5 21,4 25,5 33,3 35,6
Consumer Electronics 2,7 2,5 2,9 3,9 6,4 52,0 37,7 30,7 26,0 21,9
Household Appliances 0,6 0,4 0,7 1,3 1,8 2,8 11,6 9,6 6,6 4,6
Other Electronics 25,4 13,8 14,3 7,2 12,8 5,5 20,9 23,4 5,8 4,8
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
versus Hong Kong versus Hong Kong
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 59,1 49,3 33,9 29,5 29,8 15,9 23,0 15,6 31,2 35,4
Office Equipment 3,3 2,5 1,3 1,7 1,2 7,0 2,0 5,1 5,1 4,3
Telecommunication 3,4 3,8 6,8 3,6 3,3 0,3 4,4 6,7 3,5 3,2
Electronic Components 19,6 26,7 35,7 49,2 49,1 11,0 6,5 9,3 11,8 23,6
Consumer Electronics 5,4 5,9 7,0 8,1 8,0 47,4 41,6 33,8 30,6 23,1
Household Appliances 1,9 0,9 1,0 1,3 1,0 15,2 13,8 9,5 6,7 3,5
Other Electronics 7,3 10,9 14,4 6,6 7,7 3,3 8,8 20,0 11,1 7,0
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
versus Singapore versus Singapore
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 24,7 39,6 47,9 33,8 31,1 0,7 34,8 46,0 61,9 71,7
Office Equipment 5,1 2,3 1,2 1,8 0,8 3,4 1,8 2,0 1,9 1,4
Telecommunication 2,7 1,4 1,2 2,1 1,8 0,3 1,0 3,7 1,4 0,4
Electronic Components 43,2 42,9 31,5 41,6 51,4 52,8 24,9 18,9 16,6 14,8
Consumer Electronics 4,9 2,2 9,1 16,1 11,6 16,5 14,8 11,3 9,7 7,3
Household Appliances 5,5 0,8 0,6 0,8 0,5 4,8 6,1 2,2 1,5 1,1Other Electronics 13,9 10,7 8,4 3,8 2,8 21,4 16,6 15,9 7,2 3,3
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
TABLE  5 (continued)
Electronics : U.S. Bilateral Trade Composition with EAST ASIAN Countries 
(in percentage,  Total Electronics Trade = 100)
USA USA
% Composition of Exports % Composition of Imports
versus Malaysia versus Malaysia
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 4,4 3,1 2,9 5,5 8,3 0,1 2,6 0,5 5,2 19,6
Office Equipment 1,0 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 1,3 1,4
Telecommunication 1,5 0,7 1,0 0,8 1,4 0,0 0,9 0,6 6,6 4,1
Electronic Components 87,1 92,8 93,7 90,9 83,0 93,5 80,4 75,1 53,0 38,0
Consumer Electronics 1,2 0,3 0,2 0,5 3,4 0,9 8,5 15,5 27,3 30,9
Household Appliances 0,8 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,0 1,0 0,2 0,1 0,8
Other Electronics 3,9 2,9 2,1 1,8 3,5 5,4 6,7 7,9 6,5 5,0
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
versus Thailand versus Thailand
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 14,3 12,8 8,5 12,5 20,1 0,0 3,0 38,9 32,4 41,5
Office Equipment 3,7 2,4 0,3 0,8 0,3 0,0 0,1 0,0 1,6 6,2
Telecommunication 4,2 1,4 2,7 1,8 4,1 0,0 0,2 0,5 7,3 9,3
Electronic Components 43,3 63,6 79,9 67,1 52,1 99,8 83,4 51,2 24,8 17,1
Consumer Electronics 3,1 2,0 0,8 9,1 13,4 0,2 0,2 2,5 23,3 16,5
Household Appliances 4,2 0,5 0,6 0,7 1,3 0,0 0,1 3,4 7,6 6,1
Other Electronics 27,2 17,3 7,3 7,9 8,7 0,0 13,0 3,6 3,0 3,3
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
versus China versus China
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 70,5 61,4 48,9 49,3 24,3 3,6 0,9 1,4 2,7 16,6
Office Equipment 4,6 1,3 0,7 1,9 1,4 0,3 2,3 2,1 3,1 3,6
Telecommunication 3,6 1,7 8,4 8,2 20,6 0,0 5,3 8,3 13,0 6,4
Electronic Components 2,9 3,1 2,3 12,1 1,8 20,0 1,2 0,2 0,2 0,4
Consumer Electronics 8,9 4,8 3,8 6,7 5,5 57,2 63,0 47,6 43,8 39,6
Household Appliances 0,2 0,3 1,0 0,9 0,7 17,0 23,3 34,7 30,5 22,3
Other Electronics 9,3 27,5 34,8 20,8 45,7 1,9 4,0 5,6 6,6 11,1
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: UN and OECD trade data, from SIE World Trade Data BaseTABLE  6
ELECTRONICS: Trade composition of East Asian Countries
(in percentage %, Total Electronics Trade = 100)
IMPORT EXPORT
SINGAPORE
1980 1985 1989 1993 1980 1985 1989 1993
Electronic Data Processing 5,91 20,15 26,18 27,76 1,95 28,44 41,33 48,80
Office Equipment 3,52 2,93 2,11 2,16 3,60 2,64 2,41 1,90
Telecommunication 3,08 2,14 2,27 3,10 1,38 1,02 1,77 1,78
Electronic Components 46,42 40,61 32,90 34,34 40,62 29,99 19,69 19,16
Consumer Electronics 30,31 23,81 27,08 24,82 39,26 25,09 24,80 20,23
Household Appliances 3,22 2,99 1,74 1,30 3,98 4,37 2,10 1,35
Other Electronics 7,55 7,37 7,73 6,51 9,20 8,45 7,91 6,78
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
SOUTH KOREA
1980 1985 1989 1993 1980 1985 1989 1993
Electronic Data Processing 11,68 17,27 19,72 17,29 3,18 13,49 17,50 16,72
Office Equipment 2,81 4,44 4,78 4,29 1,81 1,05 1,23 0,86
Telecommunication 9,10 7,70 3,18 1,98 1,27 4,34 3,42 3,35
Electronic Components 43,13 46,03 54,75 55,54 27,87 23,78 27,78 36,73
Consumer Electronics 16,96 11,34 10,63 10,24 57,48 44,87 37,60 28,69
Household Appliances 3,99 3,39 1,31 1,35 3,65 7,59 7,47 6,24
Other Electronics 12,33 9,84 5,63 9,32 4,73 4,88 5,00 7,40
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
TAIWAN
1980 1985 1989 1993 1980 1985 1989 1993
Electronic Data Processing 11,18 18,51 18,40 17,44 2,07 15,43 46,33 54,59
Office Equipment 2,94 2,98 2,70 2,16 3,93 3,90 4,39 1,76
Telecommunication 11,46 6,62 5,46 2,98 1,65 4,90 4,24 4,40
Electronic Components 30,07 40,44 45,65 59,00 16,10 14,33 12,79 22,99
Consumer Electronics 20,41 12,62 15,62 10,54 55,43 28,13 18,04 7,03
Household Appliances 3,51 3,45 6,16 2,78 2,72 5,39 7,77 3,75
Other Electronics 20,42 15,39 6,00 5,09 18,11 27,94 6,44 5,47
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
HONG KONG
1980 1985 1989 1993 1980 1985 1989 1993
Electronic Data Processing 14,77 15,40 11,99 13,86 9,20 17,80 16,10 18,21
Office Equipment 4,37 6,38 3,56 3,05 3,31 4,43 3,96 3,71
Telecommunication 4,13 3,20 4,97 4,31 0,32 3,92 5,05 4,71
Electronic Components 25,26 24,20 25,35 24,51 12,87 12,80 15,10 14,03
Consumer Electronics 40,70 36,79 40,02 35,58 60,75 39,43 39,90 37,88
Household Appliances 5,81 7,20 7,10 7,10 9,97 12,21 9,58 9,20
Other Electronics 4,94 6,83 7,02 11,58 3,57 9,41 10,31 12,25
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100TABLE  6    (continued)
ELECTRONICS: Trade composition of East Asian Countries
(in percentage %, Total Electronics Trade = 100)
IMPORT EXPORT
THAILAND
1980 1985 1989 1993 1980 1985 1989 1993
Electronic Data Processing 3,37 17,44 35,02 27,47 0,52 4,46 40,72 35,70
Office Equipment 13,69 21,74 2,06 2,47 21,76 80,69 1,03 4,78
Telecommunication 22,14 12,91 6,79 6,74 2,15 0,12 3,28 5,18
Electronic Components 12,75 2,80 33,76 38,56 0,06 0,45 28,39 23,26
Consumer Electronics 14,07 11,80 10,35 12,42 57,74 7,21 16,97 21,33
Household Appliances 11,68 4,87 3,23 2,08 10,85 2,44 8,15 6,48
Other Electronics 22,29 28,45 8,80 10,24 6,92 4,62 1,46 3,27
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
MALAYSIA
1980 1985 1989 1993 1980 1985 1989 1993
Electronic Data Processing 2,40 5,91 8,37 11,97 0,04 1,08 3,23 17,54
Office Equipment 2,31 1,34 1,03 0,76 0,11 0,10 0,61 1,35
Telecommunication 6,26 8,91 2,90 2,35 0,24 0,63 2,12 3,41
Electronic Components 69,59 67,54 67,18 61,72 91,22 80,69 59,44 39,90
Consumer Electronics 11,67 9,89 10,19 11,83 4,58 11,41 27,33 31,45
Household Appliances 2,77 1,93 1,08 1,15 0,47 0,98 0,50 0,99
Other Electronics 5,00 4,47 9,25 10,23 3,33 5,11 6,77 5,36
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
CHINA
1980 1985 1989 1993 1980 1985 1989 1993
Electronic Data Processing 16,68 14,70 15,28 15,48 1,30 6,67 3,87 14,88
Office Equipment 4,53 6,50 2,40 2,25 4,23 4,35 3,59 3,73
Telecommunication 1,72 4,04 12,00 23,19 0,68 4,65 7,11 6,07
Electronic Components 3,57 5,09 8,57 18,30 1,81 1,89 0,79 3,04
Consumer Electronics 60,69 43,69 29,80 15,85 46,32 61,94 58,56 49,53
Household Appliances 2,61 9,95 6,69 2,72 27,69 14,48 20,97 14,66
Other Electronics 10,19 16,03 25,25 22,20 17,96 6,01 5,11 8,08
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: UN and OECD trade data, from SIE World Trade Data Base23
  Take the case of Seagate, a leading US producer of hard disk drives (HDDs). In 1982, when
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it chose Singapore as the final assembly place of HDDs, it was one of the few locations in Asia
that already had in place a critical mass of support industries.
Three factors were responsible for the existence of such support industries in Singapore: 1)
Singapore's earlier prominent role as a offshore production site for cameras and optical equipment,
which led to the development of precision mechanical engineering capabilities; 2) the existence of
sophisticated government policies to promote local support industries; and 3) the pioneering role
that an American company, founded by an Indian with a Singaporean passport, has played in
establishing Singapore as an offshore production site for FDDs since the late 1970s. This company,
named Tandon, has been one of the leading suppliers of FDDs, before it went out of business.
(Ernst, 1996)
Tables 5 and  6 provide clear evidence that, since around 1988, all of these countries have gone
through a progressive integration into a variety of IPN. The composition of bilateral US exports
and imports with East Asia obviously reflects the development of a regional supply base by
American producers of semiconductors and PC-related products. This however is only part of the
story. We also find evidence for trade effects resulting from the spread of other IPN, such as those
established by consumer electronics companies from Japan and Korea, and those established by
Taiwanese computer companies. 
On the export side, the growing share of EDP and components results from the expansion of
export-oriented IPN of American computer firms in Asia. This involves final assembly activities
of equity-owned affiliates as well as the spread of a variety of inter-firm supplier networks that
range from OEM to turnkey production arrangements. US computer companies now also pursue
aggressive strategies to penetrate some of the important new growth markets in East Asia. The
story is more complicated for U.S. imports. To some degree, they result from increasing sales of
subsidiaries of American companies and related suppliers back to the U.S. Increasingly, however,
they also reflect the spread of Japanese IPN in Asia and the substantially improved competitiveness
of some Korean and Taiwanese firms. 
In what follows, we will discuss our findings in more detail and demonstrate how the spread of
diverse IPN has shaped the composition of bilateral trade links between the US and East Asia. 
3.1 US trade links with Singapore  
We start with Singapore which, like no other country in the region has attracted international
production activities of American computer and disk drive manufacturers. By the early 1980s
when American firms decided to move to Singapore, low labor costs were not the primary
concern. The real decisive factor was the strength of its infrastructure and support industries
required for the manufacture of key components . 
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  Take again the example of Seagate. Over time, this company has developed a quite
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articulate regional division of labor in East Asia. Bottom-end work is done in Indonesia.
Malaysian and Thai plants make components and specialize in partial assembly. Singapore
is the centre of gravity of this regional production network: its focus is on higher-end
products and some important coordination and support functions. It completes the regional
production network, by adding testing, which requires precision.
  We get an even better idea of Singapore crucial role as a regional production hub and
222222222222222
coordination center for the Asian IPN of American computer firms, when we look at the
combined share of EDP and components in Singapore intra-regional exports: in 1993, this
share for Malaysia exceeded 57%, while in Thailand it was as high as 61%.
In the meantime, Singapore has lost whatever cost advantage it may once have possessed.
Nevertheless, it is still attracting massive investments by major American computer and disk drive
companies.  In the disk drive industry, for instance, two main reasons seem to explain the
continuous attraction of Singapore: (i) Singapore has accumulated  important locational
advantages, in terms of a first-class labor force that knows the disk drive industry inside out and
that is plugged into the necessary information circuits; (ii) all major PC producers have shifted a
large part of their production to this region, with the result that Asia is now the  most important
market for the HDD industry . Due to its central location and its excellent infrastructure
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and support industries, Singapore is thus well qualified to become the regional engineering and
coordination center for the East Asian HDD industry.
How has this affected the trade composition of Singapore’s electronics trade? First, the
composition of Singapore’s electronics exports (see Table 6) experienced radical change over the
last decade: back in the 1980, electronic components (with almost 41%) and CE (with 39%) were
responsible for  80% of these exports, while by the early 1990s EDP has become by far the most
important export group (almost 50%). The second imprtant development is that the composition
of electronic components exported by Singapore has also drastically changed, from inputs mostly
dedicated for the consumer electronics industry to shipments of parts and subassemblies to final
assembly locations within East Asia for EDP related products. This is reflected in our trade
figures. While, in 1993, more than 19% of Singapore’s electronics exports were components, their
share was much higher for Singapore’s intra regional exports (42% for Malaysia, and 25% for
Thailand) .
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Singapore electronics imports also clearly documents the importance of its integration into the IPN
of American computer firms. Already since 1985, both electronics components and EDP were by
far the most important import products and have been increasing their role during the last decade.
These findings are matched by data on US trade links with Singapore that show how US exports
to Singapore overwhelmingly have consisted of components and EDP(their combined share was
82% in 1993). EDP has played a particularly important role for US imports from this country: its
share has consistently increased from 46% in 1988 to almost 72% in 1993.US trade links with
Singapore thus primarily have been shaped by the prominent role that this country plays for the25
IPN of US computer and disk drive firms.  
US trade links with Malaysia and Thailand
Malaysia is the country, where US exports display the greatest share of product concentration. No
other country in the region comes close to the 83% share of components in US exports to
Malaysia (Table 5). What are the reasons for such a high share? 
Since the early 1970s, Malaysia has been a favorite offshore assembly location for  US
semiconductor firms. After 1990, Malaysia also became an important location for US disk drive
manufacturers. Both developments are well reflected in the product composition of Malaysia's
exports : Components continuously were the largest export category in Malaysia, despite the fact
that their share in Malaysian exports declined from more than 91% in 1980 to less than 40% in
1993. At the same time, the share of EDP in Malaysian exports has increased from a meagre 3%
in 1989 to almost 18% in 1993. One can conclude that US component exports to Malayisa have
served primarily as inputs to the final assembly and testing of ICs as well as of hard disk drives.
Almost all of these ICs and HDDs are then exported, either to the US or to US production
affiliates in Asia and Europe. The extraordinarily high share of components in US exports to this
country thus results from  Malaysia's integration into the IPN of US semiconductor and disk drive
manufacturers. 
On the other hand, Malaysia stands out as a case where two different types of IPN affect US
electronics imports. Electronics components, while declining, still constitute the most important
import product which reflects the impact of the early investment of US semiconductor firms in this
country. At the same time, however, CE has rapidly increased in importance and now constitutes
the second largest import category of US imports from Malaysia. This is a result of the massive
shift of Japanese CE manufacturers from Japan to Malaysia since around 1986, and the fact that
sales of Japanese CE products in the US now increasingly originate from transplants established
in Malaysia and elsewhere in the region. 
US trade links with Thailand (Table 5) also reflect the country's integration into two different IPN:
those established by US HDD producers that have branched out from Singapore to lower-cost
production sites within the region; and those established by Japanese producers of CE and
appliances that have rapidly expanded their production activities in this country after 1986. We
can discern the impact of the first type of IPN from the following figures. More than 52% of US
exports to Thailand consist of electronic components. While the share of components has declined
quite drastically from the almost 80% reported for 1988, the share of EDP has rapidly increased
from less than 9% to more than 20%. After 1990, when most of the above investments of US
HDD firms went on stream, there has been a substantial increase in the share of EDP in US
imports from slightly more than 32% to almost 42%. 26
  Take CRT- picture tubes for computer monitors. Taiwan’s success in this industry has
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come at a very heavy cost: nearly 2/3 of the CRTs that go into these monitors have to be
imported, either from Japan or from Japanese affiliates in Southeast Asia. The situation is
equally severe for integrated circuits and liquid crystall displays. Ernst, 1997b
3.3. U.S. trade links with Korea and Taiwan
U.S. trade links with Taiwan and Korea reflect a different and more sophisticated type of
integration into IPNs. In both countries, foreign firms, both from the U.S. and Japan, have played
an important catalytic role for the development of  electronics industry. Yet, starting from the
1980s, domestic companies have clearly played a decisive role, by accumulating a critical mass of
technological and organizational capabilities that, today, enable them to move beyond a role as
junior partners of American and Japanese firms. The formation of this capability that affected trade
specialization of both countries should thus be considered in analyzing trade links with the U.S.
Let us first look at Taiwan. In the elecronics industry, this country has achieved an extreme trade
specialization. Both its exports and imports are dominated by just one product group: EDP is
responsible for nearly 55% of exports, while nearly 60% of Taiwan’s imports are electronic
components (Table 6). Over the last decade, Taiwan has established itself as a world-class supply
source for a variety of electronic hardware products and more recently it has become the world’s
largest manufacturer of notebook PC, developing also a strong position in the semiconductor
industry. These are impressive achievements. Yet the rapid expansion of Taiwan’s PC industry has
come at a heavy cost, in terms of rapidly growing component imports (almost 60% of electronics
imports are absorbed by electronic components). The rapid expansion of production capacity and
international market share for PC-related products has not been matched by industrial deepening,
i.e. the spread of backward and forward linkages. For most of the key components that determine
the price and the performance features of its major export products, Taiwan continues to rely
heavily on imports, primarily from Japan . There are however also encouraging signs.
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If we look at Taiwan’s exports, we see that, since 1992, a quantum jup has occurred in the share
of components (from less than 14% to almost 23%), which clearly constitutes an impressive
improvement.
Let us now look  at the changes in the product composition of U.S. electronics trade with Taiwan
(Table 5) . Components are by far the most important product group of US electronics exports
to this country: their share has consistently increased since 1985 from more than 31% to almost
56%. Most of these components are semiconductors that are shipped to Taiwan as inputs to its
burgeoning PC industry. The growing share of components in US exports to Taiwan thus reflects
the increasing importance of Taiwan as a global supply base for the world PC industry that we
have described before. EDP is the second most important product group of US electronics exports
to Taiwan. Yet, at less than 18%, its share remains well below the more than 41% share that EDP27
  Korea’s component exports are dominated by computer memories, especially DRAMs,
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which are characterized by extremely high investment tresholds and very demanding
process technology. This clearly indicates a substantial improvement in the production
capabilities and in the financial power of the leading Korean electronics corporations
which are now able to compete head-on with the Japanese market leaders. (Ernst, 1997c)
has in US electronics exports in general. Of equal importance is that the share of EDP, since 1985,
has continuously declined.
Taiwan's leading position as an international supply base for the PC industry becomes even more
obvious, when we look at the product composition of US imports: 62% of these imports consist
of EDP, with more than 17% in addition consisting of components. This reflects a drastic change
in the product composition over the last eight years. In 1985, CE and appliances were responsible
for almost 40% of US imports from Taiwan. In 1988, the combined share of EDP and components
( 28%) for the first time surpassed the combined share of  CE and appliances (27%). In 1990, EDP
plus components have increased their share to 65%, which, since then, has exploded to almost
80%. While still lagging behind Singapore, Taiwan has been able to increase very rapidly the share
of EDP in US imports: from less than 9% in 1985, it increased to 52% in 1990 and almost 62%
in 1993. Electronic components also have increased their share in US imports. Yet, at slightly
more than 17%, this share still remains well below the  more than 27% share that components
occupy in US electronics imports in general. 
In the case of Korea, one important feature of its electronic industry is the very high dependence
on imports of key components, mostly from Japan and the US( nearly 56% of its imports are
electronic components).As for its exports, two product groups - consumer electronics and
electronics components - have traditionally dominated (Table 6). They continue to dominate
today, with the important difference however that, since 1992, electronics components have
overtaken CE as the leading export category  
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The second noteworthy feature of Korea’s export strucutre is its truncated shift towards industrial
electronics (EDP, telecommunication equipment, industrial automation and control system),
despite a serious effort made by the Korea’s government to achieve this goal. Since the late 1980s,
after an initial increase, the combined share of  industrial electronics has stagnated and has covered
around a ceiling of  22% for production and 21% for exports. Korean electronics industry thus
still remains confined to fairly traditional mass production activities of standard commodities and
has by and large failed to become a serious competitor for computer-related products and
telecommunication equipment.
How has this affected the product composition of U.S. electronics trade with this country? US
trade links with South Korea share some of the features that we have just described for Taiwan,28
  Ernst, 1994 b, chapter 4.
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which reflects the relatively advanced stage of the electronics industry in both countries. With a
share of more than 50%, components again dominate US exports. The share of EDP in US exports
to Korea is considerably higher than for Taiwan, yet it remains well below the  more than 41%
share that EDP has in US exports in general. 
Important differences however exist on the import side. Only a few years ago, CE and appliances
were the most important product groups. In 1985, their combined share in US imports was close
to 50%. Since then, however their share has rapidly fallen to around 40% in 1988, less than 33%
in 1990 , and less than 27% in 1993. Today, components dominate US imports from Korea,  with
a share of almost 36%. With the exception of Malaysia, this is the highest share of any East Asian
country. Korea however differs substantially from Malaysia: while Malaysia relies primarily on the
final assembly of imported semiconductors, Korea's component exports primarily consist of
memory devices, mostly DRAMs, whose production is fully integrated and thus also includes
wafer fabrication. Malaysia remains an  offshore chip assembly site, wheras Korean semiconductor
firms are able to compete on their own in the worldwide semiconductor market . 
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The second most important category of US imports from Korea are computer-related products:
their share in US imports has increased quite rapidly from less than 5% in 1988 to almost 31% in
1993. Korean firms have not been able to develop a strong position as suppliers of original brand
name PCs. Most of their EDP sales to the US consist of OEM contracts for PCs and related
peripheral equipment, especially monitors. In other words, for EDP, Korea acts as a secondary
supply base for US computer firms, yet it keeps trailing well behind both Taiwan and Singapore.
For most PC-related products thus Korean firms have failed to become important competitors on
their own. 
3.4 U.S. trade links with China
Finally, turning  to China, we can see that China’s electronics exports consistently have been
dominated by two product groups: CE and household appliances (Table 6). The combined export
share of both products reached a peak of 80% in 1989, and has fallen since then to roughly 64%
in 1993. No other country in the region displays such a high share of appliances in its exports. This
is due, in our view, to two reasons: (i) no other country can match the size of China’s domestic
market growth potential for household appliances; (ii) the still very low level of development of
China’s electronics industry that is still concentrated in the Southern coastal provinces, and mostly
confined to final assembly processes with limited local value-added. 29
A second important feature of China’s export structure is that, since 1990, the share of EDP has
increased at a very rapid pace: it doubled from less tha 6% to nearly 12% between 1990 and 1992,
and increased further to almost 15% in 1993. To a large degree this is a reflection of the rapid
expansion of Taiwanese IPN in China for the production of many PC-related products.
As to the product composition of U.S. trade links with China in the electronics industry, rpobably
the most important feature is that CE and appliances dominate US imports from this country
(Table 5). While the combined share of both products in US imports declined from 83% in 1988
to 62% in 1993, both import categories have substianlly increased in absolute terms. Most of these
imported CE and appliances  de facto constitute sales of production affiliates that Japanese as well
as Korean CE producers have established in China over the last few years. A large, albeit declining
share of US imports from China thus result from the expansion of Japanese and Korean IPN into
China.
It is also important to note that EDP has drastically increased its share in US imports: from 1%
in 1988, this share has increased to 17% in 1993. Most of these imports are sales of foreign
affiliates that Taiwanese OEM suppliers and US computer firms have established in China over
the last few years. 
As for US exports to China, we find three noteworhty developments: 1) a drastic decline in the
share of EDP from more than 49% in 1992 to less than 25% in 1993; 2) a rapid increase in the
share of telecommunications equipment from 8.2% to almost 21%; and 3) a doubling in the share
of orther electronics from less than 21% in 1992 to almost 46% in 1993. 
The declining share of EDP in US exports, in our view, results from the spread of overseas
production facilities of US computer firms in China, whose main purpose is to sell to the Chinese
market. In this case, the spread of IPN of US computer firms has led to a considerable substitution
of imports from the US. The Chinese market for telecommunications equipment is currently one
of the most attractive markets worldwide. The increasing share of telecommunications in US
exports result from the successful market penetration strategies by Motorola and AT&T.
Finally, we are hard pressed to explain the increasing share of other electronics in US exports to
China. One possible explanation could be that a number of other components, like for instance
connectors, are part of this product group. In connectors, US firms like AMP are still market
leaders, despite successful catching-up strategies of Taiwanese firms. They may have increased
their investment in China, in order to fight back the attack by Taiwanese firms. But we need
further in-depth research in order to support this hypothesis.
To sum up, since 1980, East Asia has consistently been a critical source of US electronics imports.
Reflecting the first round of US offshore assembly investments, this region was the most important
source in 1980, ahead of  Japan. In terms of product groups, apart from CE, the US has imported30
a growing share of EDP from East Asia: in 1993, almost 50% of all US EDP came form East Asia.
This clearly indicates that East Asia has now become a critical supply base for the US computer
industry. In this industry, East Asia is of much greater importance for the US than for Japan. U.S.
trade links with East Asian countries thus have been significantly shaped  by the different roles that
East Asian countries play for the international production networks of American and other global
competitor firms.31
  Ernst, 1997a
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4. Japan`s trade links with East Asia: the nexus with international production
networks
4.1 The great variety of trade links in electronics
Compared to the US, Japan's trade links with East Asia display a greater variety. This applies to
the product composition as well as to the role played by different countries in the region (Table
7). This greater diversity, we argue, results from some peculiar features of the IPN that Japanese
firms have developed in East Asia that have prevailed until the very 1990s. 
In the organization of international production in East Asia, Japan electronics firms have taken a
very different approach from American companies : they started out much earlier than
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US firms with overseas production in East Asia; Japanese firms focused on very different product
groups and markets than American firms, i.e. consumer electronics (CE) and household
appliances; domestic market-oriented, rent-seeking production rather than export platform
production remained the dominat concern until the mid-1980s; and once Japanese firms shifted
to export platform production, they have tried to keep their IPN as closed as possible to outsiders,
by centralizing almost all strategic decision-making and high value-added activities in Japan. 
The closed IPN gave rise to an asymmetric trade and investment relationship between Japan and
East Asia, leading to the emrgence of serious regional trade imbalances. Only very recently have
Japanese firms begun to gradually open their IPN, which has led to an increasing localization of
component sourcing in Asia, plus increasing exports of production equipment from Japan. At the
same time, Japanese electronics firms have now also begun to broaden the product mix that they
produce in Asia to include a variety of PC-related and telecommunications equipment products.
This has had important implications for  Japan's trade links with East Asia. Japanese electronics
exports to the region share one common feature with US electronics exports to East Asia: the
dominance of electronic components. More than 61% of Japanese exports to Taiwan and Korea
are components, nearly 59% for Malaysia, and between 44% and 43% for Thailand and Singapore.
The share of components is much lower for Hong Kong (32% in 1993), while for China, it has
fallen from slightly above 12% in 1990 to less than 7% in 1993. Overall, however, components
play a less prominent role for Japanese exports than for US exports. Other product groups, like
EDP, office equipment and CE are also important.
On the other hand we find that Japanese exports to the region have experienced great changes
over the last one and half decade. This is because up to the first half of the 1980s, Japanese32
  In 1993, 60% of the overseas affiliates of Japanese electronics firms were located in Asia.
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Out of these, two third were located in just four countries: Malaysia (24%), Taiwan (17%),
Singapore (13%), and Thailand (12%). This concentration was even higher in terms of the
labor force. (Ernst, 1996a)
electronics firms have predominantly relied on exports rather than on international production to
generate sales in the region. Since the mid-1980s however, this pattern begins to change. Offshore
production of Japanese subsidiaries in East Asia expands at a rapid pace, with the result that the
share of exports in sales to the region begins to decline. Almost all of this Asian production
activities relate to a variety of consumer products and related componets. It is also  important to
note that, within East Asia, these production activities have been heavily concentrated in
geographical terms.   
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As to Japan's electronics imports from the region, we find that in absolute terms they  are still
much lower than North America's and Europe's imports from the region. Yet, important changes
have occurred since around 1992: Japan's imports of electronics products are now growing very
rapidly, and Asia has become the most important source of these imports. The share of imports
from Asia have surged from less than 31% (Y384.6 billion) in 1988 to more than 44% (Y 962
billion) in 1993. Foreign imports account for a larger portion of domestic demand, resulting in a
significant rise in Japan's import ratio for electronics from 10.3% in 1985 to an estimated17.5%
in 1993. The most rapid increase has occurred for electronic components, where the import ratio
shot up from 16% in 1985 to more than 35% in 1993. While in 1988, the US was the only source
of imported ICs and computers, today Japan imports roughly the same amount of ICs and
computers from Asia and from the US.  Japan's import ratio has also increased for CE and
household appliances: from 2.1% in 1985, it has risen almost fivefold to 10.2% in 1993. That still
constitutes however a quite low domestic market penetration.
Apart from drastic changes in the product composition, we also find that Japanese imports from
East Asia are much more diverse than US imports. On the one hand, there is a group of four
countries where one product group dominates Japanese imports: EDP for Singapore (almost 62%
of Japanese imports); CE and appliances for China (their combined share of Japanese imports is
60%); components for Korea (48%); and CE plus appliances for Hong Kong (their combined
share accounts for 45% of Japanese imports). For each of these four countries, one product group
thus defines the role that this country plays as a supply base for Japanese firms. 
For the remaining three countries, Japanese imports consist of widely different product mixes. For
Taiwan, components (34% of Japan imports) and EDP ( almost 33%) together account for 67%
of Japanese imports. For Malaysia, CE accounts for more than 37%, yet EDP (almost 22%) and
components (slightly more than 21%) also account for significant shares. Finally, for Thailand,
EDP is the leading Japanese import category (with 37%), followed by EC ( 24%) and components33
(14%). 
What causes these highly divergent product compositions? The short answer is: the export
specialization of different countries. So are we back to the theory of comparative advantages? We
argue that this is not the case for two reasons: First, these export specializations are created and
did not result from market forces, second, they have been decisively amplified through
participation in international production networks. The existence of different, and sometimes
competing IPN has broadened the options available to Asian economies. Depending on which
products dominate their production and exports, they have been integrated into different IPN. We
find that the composition of Japanese trade with East Asia reflects the spread of IPN that Japanese
producers of consumer electronics and of related components have established in the region. Asia
has been able to strengthen its role as supply base for electronic components and PC-related
products. While in 1988, the US was the only source of imported ICs and computers, today Japan
import roughly the same amount of ICs and computers from Asia and from U.S. Furthermore, like
in the case of the U.S. before, we also find evidence of trade effects resulting from the spread of
other IPN. In the case of Japan, this include production networks established by consumer
electronics companies from Korea, and those established by American computer companies and,
more recently, Taiwanese computer companies.
4.2. The trade links between Japan and East Asia in consumer electronics and
computer related-products
Let us first look at CE and appliances, the traditional focus of Asian production activities of
Japanese electronics firms. Asia’s share in Japanese electronics imports is extremely high for CE
and appliances: in 1993, this share was close to 84%. Most of these imports originate from
Japanese transplants in Malaysia, Thailand and China. Take for instance the import of Japan from
Malaysia which show that since 1985, the share of CE has drastically increased from 2% to almost
38% in 1993. This last figure is well above the share of CE in total Japanese electronics imports
(20% in 1993). This indicates that Malaysia has now become an important supply base for
Japanese CE producers. 
For these products, Japan's trade links with East Asia are dominated by intra-firm trade, and the
spread of Japanese IPN has obviously played an important role. MITI data on the shares of intra-
firm trade in the sales and purchases of Asian affiliates of Japanese electronics firms provide some
striking evidence . In FY 1992, when most of these affiliates were still primarily engaged in the
production of CE and appliances plus related components, we find an overwhelming reliance on
intra-firm trade: 90% of the affiliates' sales to Japan were intra-firm sales, while for purchases this
share was nearly 85%. At least for consumer electronics, it is safe to conclude that East Asia's34
 Figures provided by the Market Intelligence Centre at the Institute of the Information
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Industry, Taipei, Taiwan
 Over time, important changes have occurred in the motivations. A first wave of overseas
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production was driven primarily by defensive investments of small-and medium-sized
producers of labor-intensive products (like keyboards and computer mouse). The main
motivation was to cope with the severe price reduction pressures of their foreign OEM
clients. Overseas production, for these firms, was the only way to survive the appreciation
of the NT-dollar, and the spiralling land costs and severe labor shortages in Taiwan.
Investing in mainland China with its lack of investment regulations seemed to offer an easy
way out. Larger Taiwanese firms like Acer, Mitac and First International Computer (FIC)
have entered the fray since 1992, when the Taiwanese government finally dropped earlier
trade integration with Japan has been shaped by the spread of Japanese IPN. It is equally safe to
conclude that most of the sales and purchases that result from Japanese production activities in
this region have remained confined to relatively closed intra-firm or intra-group production
networks.
The situation is very different however for computer-related products. Take for instance the case
of Taiwan which has experienced a dramatic growth of Japanese EDP-related imports. From less
than NT$ 3.9 billion in 1990, these imports have increased to more than NT$ 21 billion in 1994.
The share of components in Japanese exports to this country has also drastically increased since
1990, when the Taiwanese PC industry began to take off: within three years, it increased from
48% to almost 62% of Japanese electronics exports. On the import side of Japan we find that two
products predominate in 1993: components with 34% and EDP with almost 33%. Together they
account for more than two third of Japanese imports from Taiwan. Especially impressive is the rise
reported of these imports in the last two years: Taiwanese exports to Japan have increased by
347% for PC´s, 169% for components, 122% for terminals, and 110% for monitors .
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Equally impressive are the reductions in Taiwan's imports from Japan during the same period: -
36% for components and -35% for other peripherals. 
This increase of Japan's imports from Taiwan is driven by two developments: (i) In response to
the successful penetration of the Japanese PC market by American PC manufacturers, Japanese
PC manufacturers have drastically increased their OEM/ODM purchases from Taiwanese
computer companies; (ii) Japanese PC manufacturers have also rapidly expanded their purchases
of  a variety of PC-related components from Taiwanese firms. 
Taiwanese companies today dominate the world market for many of these products. What matters
however is that an increasing share of these products is now produced overseas, primarily in Asia.
Under tremendous competitive pressure, Taiwanese computer companies did not have much
choice but to engage in an incredibly fast expansion of overseas production. Between 1992 and
1994, the overseas production of Taiwanese computer firms more than tripled, from around $ 970
million to more than $ 3 billion . ASEAN countries and China have attracted most of
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restrictions to investments in China. Since then, these larger companies have rapidly
increased their offshore production lines both in China and Southeast Asia, redeploying
primarily large volume assembly lines for more scale-intensive products like monitors and
motherboards. The source for this and the following note, is Ernst, 1997b.
  For monitors, the share of offshore production has increased from 12.5 % in 1992, to 24%
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in 1993 to 40% last year. South East Asia accounts for roughly three quarters of the
overseas production value, with China adding another 23%. For PC motherboards, the
pace of expanding overseas production has been truly breath-taking: in 1994, overseas
production  grew by almost 90%. The share of overseas production in Taiwan's total sales
of motherboards has increased from 26% in 1993 to more than 34% in 1994. As demand
for these products keeps growing very rapidly, the main motivation for this type of
investment has been to expand production capacities, especially for lower-end products,
without having to shoulder the very high fixed capital cost burdens that are characteristic
today for investments in Taiwan.
these investments .
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The result is that we are now dealing with increasingly complex forms of IPN. Taiwanese
computer firms act primarily as OEM suppliers. Yet, at the same time, the Taiwanese production
system for EDP  has to be coordinated across national boundaries. Take a typical OEM contract
between a Taiwanese PC manufacturer and a Japanese customer. Final assembly and shipping is
done in Tawain, with the result that this OEM contract shows up as an increase of Japanese
imports from Taiwan. Yet, many of the components and subassemblies are no longer produced
in Taiwan and are in fact supplied by Taiwanese affiliates in China or in Southeast Asia. Japanese
imports of EDP and components from East Asia may be fed from a variety of sources that belong
to different IPN. Japanese firms certainly play an important role, but they are  no longer an
exclusive driving force. For computer-related products, it is thus difficult to deny that strategies
of Taiwanese firms are now playing a crucial role for the shift to intra-regional trade in East Asia.
This small example clearly indicates that we have to be very careful in our conclusions on what
are the driving forces behind the changes in the region's trade patterns: Japanese international
production strategies matter, but they are certainly not the only force to be reckoned with. It is
often claimed that the massive expansion of Japanese manufacturing FDI to East Asia has been
the root cause for recent changes in East Asia's trade patterns, and especially for its much faster
economic integration. Like all half-truths, this popular assertion can be misleading, if it would  lead
us to neglect the important role of international production networks established by electronics
firms from the US, Europe, Korea and Taiwan. In the electronics industry, Japanese firms are not
the only ones that have established international production networks in Asia. Nor have they
always been the first . Japanese firms have clearly ceased to be the only carriers of Asian
regionalization .
To sum up, despite its close proximity, East Asia has played a much less prominent role as a
source of Japanese electronics imports than it did for the US. Until 1990, Japanese electronics36
imports overwhelmingly originated from the US, and even in 1993, East Asia’s share was
significantly lower than that of the US. More recently, this pattern has begun to change and the
role of East Asia as source of Japanese electronics has been rising. 
On the other hand, fundamental differences exist in the logic of integration of American and
Japanese companies with East Asia. For the US, the focus clearly is on computer -related
products, while for Japan, until very recently, the focus overwhelmingly has been on consumer
products. TABLE 7
Electronics : JAPAN  Bilateral Trade Composition with EAST ASIAN Countries 
(in percentage,  Total Electronics Trade = 100)
JAPAN JAPAN
% Composition of Exports % Composition of Imports
versus Taiwan versus Taiwan
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 5,4 13,3 16,3 18,5 15,8 4,1 17,0 11,5 17,8 32,7
Office Equipment 3,9 4,8 4,2 3,3 3,6 1,0 3,5 14,1 7,1 3,3
Telecommunication 6,9 3,0 4,0 4,2 2,4 1,5 3,0 7,4 8,3 3,1
Electronic Components 35,8 46,6 47,9 48,1 61,5 47,2 47,6 21,7 35,9 34,1
Consumer Electronics 26,9 17,5 20,1 17,2 9,4 33,4 17,2 30,4 15,7 14,6
Household Appliances 3,4 3,7 3,4 3,8 3,6 3,9 2,0 10,9 7,8 8,1
Other Electronics 17,7 11,1 4,1 4,9 3,7 8,9 9,8 4,1 7,5 4,1
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
versus South Korea versus South Korea
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 11,3 19,9 16,5 17,0 11,6 3,0 9,2 11,3 14,2 7,0
Office Equipment 3,4 3,2 3,7 5,7 9,3 5,2 2,1 2,1 2,3 1,2
Telecommunication 3,1 1,6 1,0 1,2 0,8 0,7 1,2 4,0 5,3 3,9
Electronic Components 35,3 42,6 54,4 55,6 61,2 40,7 34,8 24,0 28,7 48,0
Consumer Electronics 23,5 18,7 15,7 12,6 10,1 35,8 40,5 46,6 38,0 33,5
Household Appliances 3,0 0,8 1,1 1,0 1,0 0,3 0,9 4,7 4,7 3,1
Other Electronics 20,4 13,2 7,5 6,9 6,0 14,3 11,3 7,4 6,9 3,1
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
versus Hong Kong versus Hong Kong
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 3,7 7,3 13,3 14,2 10,9 7,9 19,8 23,8 29,2 35,2
Office Equipment 6,8 10,1 4,8 5,0 5,1 0,1 1,3 6,3 5,6 10,0
Telecommunication 0,8 3,2 7,0 5,1 3,4 0,1 3,8 3,2 7,6 1,7
Electronic Components 19,1 23,0 29,8 24,7 32,0 6,0 9,8 3,9 6,2 11,2
Consumer Electronics 58,8 45,5 34,1 38,0 33,0 80,0 58,6 53,4 38,7 39,2
Household Appliances 7,8 5,2 3,8 2,8 2,2 3,3 6,4 6,8 5,3 2,0
Other Electronics 3,0 5,7 7,2 10,3 13,3 2,6 0,3 2,5 7,3 0,7
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
versus Singapore versus Singapore
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 2,0 6,9 12,1 13,2 19,7 3,1 27,8 22,3 53,2 61,8
Office Equipment 5,6 6,0 3,2 3,3 4,0 5,6 0,0 0,8 0,2 0,2
Telecommunication 4,9 3,8 3,8 3,7 2,7 0,0 0,7 2,3 0,5 0,4
Electronic Components 16,9 27,9 36,9 35,4 43,3 42,2 34,8 8,6 12,3 19,0
Consumer Electronics 55,1 38,3 32,6 35,5 22,1 36,9 35,1 59,4 29,5 16,0
Household Appliances 6,1 6,4 2,7 1,4 1,1 9,1 0,9 1,2 0,2 0,3
Other Electronics 9,5 10,8 8,6 7,4 7,0 3,1 0,8 5,3 4,0 2,2
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100TABLE 7  (continued)
Electronics : JAPAN  Bilateral Trade Composition with EAST ASIAN Countries 
(in percentage,  Total Electronics Trade = 100)
JAPAN JAPAN
% Composition of Exports % Composition of Imports
versus Malaysia versus Malaysia
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 1,7 3,3 3,5 7,0 6,8 0,0 0,4 3,9 14,0 21,9
Office Equipment 3,1 2,8 1,3 1,5 1,0 0,2 0,0 0,8 9,1 5,2
Telecommunication 7,2 12,0 1,8 4,7 5,0 0,0 0,0 1,4 1,3 7,1
Electronic Components 40,5 44,4 74,1 57,9 58,6 82,3 95,3 68,1 40,5 21,3
Consumer Electronics 28,9 22,2 11,5 17,4 20,8 15,1 2,1 22,0 24,5 37,6
Household Appliances 6,7 6,6 2,4 1,7 1,0 0,0 0,0 1,9 1,6 2,5
Other Electronics 11,9 8,6 5,4 9,8 6,7 2,3 2,1 2,0 9,1 4,4
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
versus Thailand versus Thailand
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 2,8 12,2 17,4 15,6 20,2 0,0 38,5 54,6 46,1 37,0
Office Equipment 10,8 6,7 5,4 4,1 4,4 0,0 6,1 5,8 5,2 8,0
Telecommunication 15,4 24,5 19,9 19,3 6,5 0,0 0,2 0,8 6,8 3,6
Electronic Components 13,5 5,5 20,8 27,2 44,3 3,3 2,9 6,4 7,8 14,0
Consumer Electronics 18,8 19,8 16,2 22,6 16,0 3,3 2,4 24,0 23,4 24,3
Household Appliances 13,0 8,3 6,9 3,0 1,8 11,0 0,3 7,9 8,7 9,8
Other Electronics 25,6 23,0 13,5 8,2 6,8 82,4 49,7 0,6 1,9 3,4
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
versus China versus China
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993 1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Electronic Data Processing 10,9 5,2 5,4 4,8 9,5 0,0 2,2 0,8 4,3 18,0
Office Equipment 4,9 5,7 5,0 4,3 4,0 0,0 0,0 17,2 9,8 4,5
Telecommunication 1,6 1,6 11,4 7,3 25,2 0,0 0,0 2,7 8,1 4,4
Electronic Components 5,0 3,0 10,5 12,4 6,9 0,0 9,3 0,6 1,6 2,3
Consumer Electronics 72,0 65,0 51,2 61,5 45,7 61,0 88,2 67,1 55,9 54,3
Household Appliances 0,7 11,3 9,8 3,5 2,1 2,2 0,2 7,6 7,9 5,8
Other Electronics 4,9 8,2 6,7 6,3 6,6 36,7 0,1 4,0 12,4 10,8
Total Electronics Trade 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: UN and OECD trade data, from SIE World Trade Data Base39
5. The emergence of serious regional trade imbalances
The pattern of Japanese international production networks in East Asia  has had important
implications for  Japan's trade links with the region: On the one hand, we can discern a
displacement of exports of final products, primarily CE and appliances, from Japan by sales from
Asian affiliates of Japanese firms. At the same time, we find that  exports of components and
production equipment  from Japan to East Asia have rapidly expanded. During FY 1994, Japanese
exports of electronic components to Asia increased by nearly 33%. We have seen that Japan's
reverse imports from the region have also increased, especially for CE and home appliances. Yet,
these imports continue to be substantially smaller than the exports of components and production
equipment from Japan, producing trade huge imbalances within the region. 
If these trade imbalances remain unchecked, this will lead, sooner or later, to increasing regional
trade conflicts and to a deterioriating climate for economic relations within the region. 
Tables 8 and 9 display the fundamental difference that distinguishes Japan’s trade links with East
Asia from those established by the U.S. In 1993, Japan exported almost 28 bn dollars of electronic
products to the region, while its imports were a miserably 7.3 bn. This fundamental asymmetry has
led to a huge bilateral trade surplus of Japan with East Asia in electronics of almost 21 bn dollars.
The situation is fundamentally different for US trade links with this region. The U.S. imported $
42.6 bn worth of electronic products from East Asia, almost 6 times the import value of Japan.
The U.S. import from East Asia were also substantially larger than its exports ($ 18 bn), with the
result that the U.S. ends up with a trade deficit in electronics with East Asia that comes close to
$ 25bn. 
The product composition of the two trade balances is also different. In the case of the U.S.,
computer related product show a deficit ($15 bn) that is more than 60 % of the total bilateral U.S.
trade deficit, while CE is responsible for roughly another 30%. Both Taiwan and Singapore
accounts for the lion’s share of the U.S. deficit in EDP products, while Malaysia is responsible for
a significant share of the CE product trade deficit. 
In the case of Japan, Table 9 clealry indicates that component exports are by far the main cause
for Japan’s trade surplus with East Asia. In 1993, electronics components have accounted for the
largest share in Malaysia, Taiwan and Singapore, although in each of these countries the causes
for this high dependence on component imports from Japan differ.
Different root causes could explain Japan’s huge bilateral trade surplus with East Asia (Cohen
andGuerrieri, 1994). The first one continues to be substantial constraints to imports into the
Japanese market. The second one is the relatively closed organization of Japanese international40
  This concept claims that the net exports resulting from the establishment of a foreign
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affiliate ususally decline at first and then rise. It draws an analogy to the J-curve effect of a
currency devaluation.
  A recent study by the Sakura Research Institute (Takayasu and Ishizaki, 1995, p.17) shows
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that, for key components, like ICs and LCDs, Japan's exports to East Asia will continue to
surpass by far any such imports from the region and that Japan will be able to sustain for
quite some time a significant absolute competitive advantage. This is hardly surprising for
anyone familiar with the electronics industry. Imports of key components, in general, are
likely to grow periodically and thus tend to follow a similar pattern as that for the more
sophisticated capital goods imports. The reason is straightforward: Suppose a country
strives to increase local production for a certain key component required for a particular
product Pt. And suppose further that sufficiently strong companies exist in the country that
can hurdle the substantial entry barriers that characterize the production of such key
components  - an assumption which surely cannot be taken for granted. Even then,
catching-up requires a certain period of time. Even under the best of all circumstances, the
latecomer may thus end up in a paradoxical situation: Once he has finally succeeded in
producing a substantial part of the key components required for Pt, the industry may
already have moved on to the next product generation(s) Pt1 or Pt2, with the result that
much of the catching-up efforts may have been in vain.
production networks in East Asia and their peculiar product mix. Both constraints however are
now gradually becoming less stringent and East Asia’s share in Japanese electronics imports is
rapidly increasing (Guerrieri, 1995). 
Some observers argue that East Asia’s bilateral trade deficit with Japan are unproblematic. One
version of this argument purports that due to the so called J-curve effect of FDI , these
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deficits are likely to decline anyway, once the initial set up phase is over, and the Japanese affiliates
begin to increase their local procurement. It is argued in addition that East Asia can benefit from
the prevalence of ‘triangular trade’: as long as its trade surpluses with the U.S. and Europe are
larger than its trade deficit with Japan, there should not be any problem.
None of these assumption, however, can be taken for granted. As for the FDI argument, it is not
realistic to assume that capital goods imports will decline, once the initial set-up phase is over. In
the electronics industry, with its short product cycles and its often quite radical paradigm shifts,
a latecomer cannot count on a continuous decline of capital goods imports. Such imports, on the
contrary, are likely to increase periodically, with each shift to a new product generation, with each
extension of the product mix, and with each shift in the technology paradigm. The same is true for
the imports of those key components that are essential for the cost and performance features of
a particular product   
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As for the ‘triangular trade argument’, there is also reason to be skeptical. At least in the
electronics industry, East Asia trade surpluses with the U.S. and Europe have started to declne,
while the region’s trade deficit with Japan has continued to increase.41
In short, those who claim that East Asia’s bilateral trade deficit with Japan are unproblematic,
need to provide evidence that all of the above-mentioned conditions can be met. They also need
to provide evidence that each of the affected economies can smoothly adjust to the restructuring
requirements that result from these growing trade deficits and that trade frictions can be contained
without disruptive policy reactions. TABLE 8
UNITED  STATES: ELECTRONICS TRADE BALANCES
(in absolute terms, US Dollars, 000 Thousands) 
versus Taiwan
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics Trade -942.021 -2.450.628 -3.763.370 -3.734.881 -5.539.719
Electronic Data Processing 52.968 -108.159 -501.403 -2.560.724 -4.700.681
Office Equipment -40.197 -97.381 -222.345 -194.454 -197.976
Telecommunication 27.389 -118.015 -143.167 59.694 -120.854
Electronic Components -94.382 -105.487 -55.895 33.567 135.610
Consumer Electronics -675.496 -879.121 -938.561 -534.062 -209.528
Household Appliances -28.850 -176.231 -203.387 -305.919 -371.563
Other Electronics -183.453 -966.234 -1.698.612 -232.983 -74.727
versus South Korea
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics Trade -480.845 -1.708.549 -4.053.680 -3.577.635 -4.743.158
Electronic Data Processing 33.546 98.008 148.730 -688.310 -1.641.521
Office Equipment -14.786 -44.570 -102.664 -47.390 -40.608
Telecommunication 22.474 -12.750 -160.564 -54.255 975
Electronic Components -150.155 -104.783 -692.345 -931.088 -1.320.754
Consumer Electronics -377.993 -936.123 -1.647.489 -1.341.049 -1.426.450
Household Appliances -19.256 -291.097 -518.414 -335.028 -285.339
Other Electronics 25.325 -417.234 -1.080.934 -180.515 -29.461
versus Hong Kong
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics Trade -612.164 -1.300.684 -1.640.157 -1.165.207 84.765
Electronic Data Processing 72.990 -140.270 -71.951 -382.049 -105.593
Office Equipment -57.386 -23.137 -121.825 -96.168 -70.357
Telecommunication 10.641 -61.003 -109.469 -39.260 5.160
Electronic Components -33.678 38.144 113.516 270.481 630.570
Consumer Electronics -455.368 -756.508 -824.011 -602.218 -341.979
Household Appliances -145.163 -256.439 -242.758 -137.233 -56.249
Other Electronics -4.200 -101.471 -383.659 -178.760 23.213
versus Singapore
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics Trade -876.075 -1.450.302 -3.313.370 -4.379.202 -5.347.269
Electronic Data Processing 52.187 -460.445 -1.483.527 -3.426.638 -5.600.345
Office Equipment -25.548 -21.944 -82.171 -85.957 -101.829
Telecommunication 2.997 -11.561 -175.912 -41.427 35.932
Electronic Components -486.259 -199.623 -355.815 -85.595 805.623
Consumer Electronics -172.685 -327.405 -418.922 -258.660 -202.536
Household Appliances -40.983 -135.787 -106.992 -82.697 -89.143
Other Electronics -205.784 -293.537 -690.031 -398.228 -194.971TABLE 8   (continued)
UNITED  STATES: ELECTRONICS TRADE BALANCES
(in absolute terms, US Dollars, 000 Thousands) 
versus Malaysia
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics Trade -726.754 -509.586 -779.511 -1.461.503 -4.850.028
Electronic Data Processing 7.492 -7.809 27.446 -71.460 -1.248.482
Office Equipment 1.502 851 -1.526 -36.174 -104.596
Telecommunication 2.443 -6.165 -549 -190.509 -272.632
Electronic Components -691.457 -301.019 -341.357 -151.464 -657.779
Consumer Electronics -6.101 -115.847 -321.947 -839.813 -2.224.971
Household Appliances 1.589 -12.218 -2.938 -44 -58.706
Other Electronics -42.222 -67.379 -138.640 -172.039 -282.862
versus Thailand
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Commercio Totale -28.531 -2.630 -227.996 -796.548 -1.755.973
Electronic Data Processing 8.094 17.796 -263.373 -407.625 -959.658
Office Equipment 2.123 4.257 1.566 -18.607 -173.642
Telecommunication 2.391 2.157 11.726 -98.862 -217.967
Electronic Components -60.466 -38.538 48.302 121.742 75.459
Consumer Electronics 1.564 3.311 -15.592 -293.380 -321.759
Household Appliances 2.358 884 -23.673 -112.863 -158.669
Other Electronics 15.405 7.503 13.048 13.047 263
versus China
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics Trade 39.917 200.558 -602.515 -1.774.011 -3.720.944
Electronic Data Processing 28.612 153.514 140.529 74.450 -548.003
Office Equipment 1.864 2.161 -16.905 -57.432 -153.473
Telecommunication 1.452 1.471 -49.889 -242.956 -110.099
Electronic Components 1.026 7.319 5.039 26.914 -1.726
Consumer Electronics 3.228 -19.725 -424.708 -874.753 -1.778.701
Household Appliances -42 -11.034 -315.011 -619.558 -1.024.541
Other Electronics 3.777 66.852 58.430 -80.676 -104.401
Source: UN and OECD trade data, from SIE World Trade Data BaseTABLE 9
JAPAN: ELECTRONICS TRADE BALANCES
(in absolute terms, US Dollars, 000 Thousands) 
versus USA
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics Trade 4.060.421 15.955.527 20.866.554 18.941.205 25.276.702
Electronic Data Processing -380.213 2.069.389 6.279.822 6.207.868 10.483.103
Office Equipment 873.222 2.152.507 2.533.712 2.257.540 3.034.442
Telecommunication 151.035 875.793 1.724.092 1.066.769 1.242.552
Electronic Components 186.135 768.586 1.821.619 1.587.274 3.079.293
Consumer Electronics 2.438.975 7.770.473 5.644.296 5.088.051 4.424.234
Household Appliances 257.311 614.315 319.204 239.916 275.876
Other Electronics 533.956 1.704.464 2.543.809 2.493.787 2.737.202
versus Taiwan
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics Trade 356.290 613.630 2.068.941 2.305.375 3.563.598
Electronic Data Processing 21.390 73.963 374.875 431.068 381.925
Office Equipment 18.166 32.065 9.086 43.238 133.287
Telecommunication 32.490 18.677 55.958 62.277 78.992
Electronic Components 110.389 284.107 1.198.601 1.211.023 2.482.180
Consumer Electronics 85.773 107.662 334.227 409.648 279.499
Household Appliances 11.482 26.542 12.239 56.280 78.852
Other Electronics 76.600 70.614 83.955 91.841 128.863
versus South Korea
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics Trade 275.094 659.784 1.848.388 1.494.362 1.497.414
Electronic Data Processing 45.461 161.483 362.077 286.181 254.547
Office Equipment 6.295 23.897 87.396 122.675 281.090
Telecommunication 12.770 11.446 -13.353 -29.328 -42.349
Electronic Components 87.826 303.012 1.336.234 1.141.993 1.149.650
Consumer Electronics 42.753 62.326 -45.004 -104.672 -263.289
Household Appliances 13.198 5.510 -18.717 -26.548 -22.462
Other Electronics 66.791 92.110 139.755 104.061 140.227
versus Hong Kong
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics Trade 870.249 1.568.342 2.935.488 3.416.044 5.732.422
Electronic Data Processing 29.907 105.001 359.573 438.334 520.526
Office Equipment 62.148 164.309 136.995 167.676 272.484
Telecommunication 7.165 50.161 216.238 166.878 203.624
Electronic Components 172.682 371.163 946.281 898.802 1.924.398
Consumer Electronics 501.516 703.784 946.315 1.295.623 1.868.498
Household Appliances 70.219 79.945 104.209 87.272 127.117
Other Electronics 26.612 93.979 225.877 361.459 815.775TABLE  9 (continued)
JAPAN: ELECTRONICS TRADE BALANCES
(in absolute terms, US Dollars, 000 Thousands) 
versus Singapore
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics Trade 666.204 1.018.144 2.260.815 3.025.373 4.896.330
Electronic Data Processing 13.087 60.287 251.832 191.560 382.807
Office Equipment 37.025 63.297 78.026 116.295 248.690
Telecommunication 33.769 39.621 89.411 128.707 162.766
Electronic Components 105.342 280.962 895.724 1.191.344 2.455.259
Consumer Electronics 372.288 391.740 679.336 1.105.919 1.167.976
Household Appliances 39.664 67.778 64.677 49.575 67.331
Other Electronics 65.029 114.459 201.809 241.973 411.501
versus Malaysia
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics Trade 190.522 347.823 646.259 848.471 1.765.378
Electronic Data Processing 3.867 13.052 22.466 39.043 -33.089
Office Equipment 6.969 11.385 8.959 -10.163 -25.531
Telecommunication 16.453 48.098 11.955 50.412 68.505
Electronic Components 61.740 127.340 484.392 543.130 1.416.968
Consumer Electronics 60.126 88.103 64.665 126.823 194.098
Household Appliances 15.250 26.598 15.878 14.518 1.794
Other Electronics 26.117 33.247 37.944 84.708 142.633
versus Thailand
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Commercio Totale 87.594 185.520 355.376 564.470 706.242
Electronic Data Processing 2.483 22.423 44.277 -2.772 4.962
Office Equipment 9.475 12.446 18.800 19.991 760
Telecommunication 13.543 45.647 79.659 146.226 70.699
Electronic Components 11.842 10.245 80.571 211.139 561.827
Consumer Electronics 16.493 36.843 54.054 125.427 44.905
Household Appliances 11.428 15.499 23.925 -184 -52.951
Other Electronics 22.330 42.417 54.090 64.643 76.040
versus China
1980 1985 1988 1990 1993
Total Electronics Trade 219.632 2.015.664 1.204.532 793.363 1.464.453
Electronic Data Processing 24.242 104.695 68.078 38.632 68.402
Office Equipment 10.781 114.936 50.936 22.450 55.497
Telecommunication 3.595 33.010 143.780 56.271 541.100
Electronic Components 10.990 59.931 133.886 120.143 139.044
Consumer Electronics 158.451 1.309.135 605.004 499.192 598.091
Household Appliances 1.471 227.661 120.087 18.760 340
Other Electronics 10.102 166.296 82.761 37.915 61.979
Source: UN and OECD trade data, from SIE World Trade Data Base  An account of these and the following recent changes in the Asian production networks of
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Japanese electronics firms can be found in Ernst, 1997a. For changes in the international
production networks of American electronics firms, see Ernst, 1996.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed U.S. and Japanese trade links in electronics with East Asia and attempted
to relate them to the different features of the international production networks that American and
Japanese electronics firms have established in this region.  The main findings can be summarized
as follows: There are important differences in the trade links that the U.S. and Japan have
established with East Asia in the electronics industry, related to the role played by different
countries in the region as well as to the product composition of these trade links.
First, East Asia has played a much more prominent role as a source of US electronics imports than
it did for Japan.  This pattern is now changing, with the result that East Asia has become a major
source of Japanese electronics imports. As for US imports from these countries, we find a variety
of results which reflect the different stage of development of each of these countries and the
different role that each of these locations play as export platforms for the US market. In the case
of Japan, we find that there is a group of four countries where one product group dominates
Japanes imports and defines the role played by each individual country as a supply base for
Japanese firms.  
Secondly, U.S. and Japanese electronics exports to East Asia share one common feature: the
dominance of electronic components. However, Japanese exports to the region have experienced
greater changes over the last one and half decade than US exports. This relects the fact that
Japanese electronics firms, until recently,  have predominantly relied on exports rather than on
international production to generate sales in the region.  This, however is now beginning to
change: penetrating Asia`s contested growth markets for electronics has become a major
objective .
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Thirdly, other fundamental differences exist in the logic of integration of American and Japanese
companies with East Asia with regard to the product composition of trade links. For the US, the
focus clearly is on computer-related products: the growing share of these products in U.S. trade
indicates the rapid globalization of the U.S. computer industry and the critical role played by East
Asia as a supply base both for final assembly and component manufacturing. For Japan, until very
recently, the focus of integration overwhelmingly has been on consumer products. Only recently
has Japan begun to broaden the trade product mix by including a variety of  products related to
the computer and telecommunications equipment industries. These significant differences of trade patterns that link the U.S. and Japan with East Asian
countries can only be partially attributed to traditional comparative advantages based on factor
endowments and costs. The paper shows how these observed differences can be better explained
by some peculiar features of the international production networks that American and Japanese
firms have established in East Asia.    
Since the late 1970s, American electronic firms, especially for PC-related products, including a
variety of semiconductor devices, have played a pioneering role in establishing international
production networks in East Asia, developing new forms of organizing international production
that did not necessarily involve equity control. The early lead in the development of new and
indirect forms of organizing international production has conveyed substantial competitive
advantages to US computer companies. This has set in motion a virtuous circle: By redeploying
lower-end stages of the value chain to Asia, American electronics companies were able to
concentrate on what they do best, i.e. on product design and the definition of global brand names
and architectural standards, and on the control of distribution channels. A focus on such higher
stages of the value chain has generated high profit margins, increasing the disposable funds for
R&D and investment. This has enabled American companies to stay ahead through aggressive new
product development and the creation of new and more sophisticated entry barriers.
In the organization of international production in East Asia, Japan electronics firms have taken a
very different approach from American companies: they have focused on very different product
groups and markets than American firms, and in the export platform production they have tried
to keep their production networks as closed as possible to outsiders, by centralizing almost all
strategic decision-making and high value-added activities in Japan. Only since around 1991 have
Japanese firms begun to gradually open their Asian production networks, which has led to an
increasing localization of component sourcing in Asia, plus increasing exports of production
equipment from Japan.
The closed nature of Japanese production networks in Asia has led to an asymmetric trade and
investment relationship between Japan and East Asia, leading to serious regional trade imbalances.
The result is that East Asia has a huge bilateral trade deficit with Japan. The situation is
fundamentally different for the U.S., which has experienced a significant bilateral trade deficit with
East Asia in the electronics industry during the past one and half decade, mostly attributable to
structural factors such as the greater openness of the U.S. market and to the ‘open organization’
of the U.S. international production networks.    
Finally, we have to draw attention to two limitations of this study. First, we have to be very careful
in the conclusions on what are the driving forces behind the changes in the region's trade patterns:
U.S. and Japanese international production strategies matter, but they are certainly not the only
force to be reckoned with. As emphasized in the paper, one should not neglect the important role
of international production networks established by electronics firms from Korea, Taiwan, morerecently China, and of course Europe. The result is that we are now dealing with increasingly
complex forms of international production networks in the region. 
Secondly, the paper provides some empirical materials and defines some stylized facts on the
interaction between trade, FDI and international production networks in the electronics industry,
by using a set of assumptions that are at this stage rather tentative. In this regard, as outlined at
the beginning of the paper,  it reflects the infant stage of economic theory on this issue. More
rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis is certainly required, and should be inserted in any
future research agenda on this topic.References
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